A STUDY OF IRON AND STEEL SUBSIDY by Hirota, Shiro
TitleA STUDY OF IRON AND STEEL SUBSIDY
Author(s)Hirota, Shiro










VOLUME XXI NUMBER 2 
Kyoto University 
Economic Review 
MEMOIRS OF THE FACULTY OF ECONOMICS 
IN 
THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY 
OCTOBER 1951 
A Study of Iron and Steel Subsidy 
Analysis of Distribution Structure in the Iron 
and Steel Industry 
PUBL TSHEO BY 
THE F ACUL TY OF ECONOMCS 
THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY 
KYOTO, ]AP AN 
S. Hirota 1 
S. Suzuki 48 
KYOTO UNIVERSITY 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 
MEMORIES OF THE FACULTY OF ECONOMICS 
IN 
THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY 
VOLUME XXI (October 1951) NUMBER 2 
A STUDY OF IRON AND STEEL SUBSIDY 
By Shir'o Hirota 
1. FOREWORD ......... IRON AND STEEL CONTROL 
. As is well known, the Japanese iron and steel industry had a military 
character from the very begining. 
As Japan was late in adopting capitalism, it had to carry out a 
capitalistic reform perforce in a short time following the Meiji Restoration 
without completely getting rid of the semi-feudalistic relation of pro-
duction. 
Needless to say, the State played an important role in expediting 
the capitalistic transformation. And the State's assistance in the trans-
formation had much to do with its military design to make Japan strong 
enough to hold its own against older capitalistic countries. Or rather, 
the military design was the very motive behind the State action. 
It was natural, meanWhile, that iron and steel, which are a basic 
material for capitalistic production as well as a commodity indispensable 
to the manufacture of arms, had a nuclear position in the development 
of capitalism in Japan. 
The development of capitalistic economy in Japan was characterized 
by the narrowness of the domestic market and the absolute shortage of 
natural resources in the country. These conditions were especially 
conspicuous in the iron and steel industry. 
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These were the circumstances which enabled the State to interfere 
with the iron and steel industry. 
After several wars the iron and steel industry became the most 
typical of the industries subjected to State control, as was quite natural 
in view of the fact that it was very difficult both technically and economi-
cally to entrust the industry, which is not only a means to increase 
the national strength but al£o requires a huge capital of highly organic 
composition, to private management based on naturally accumulated capital. 
In, submitting a budget for the establishment of the Yawata Iron 
Works to the ninth session of the Imperial Diet the Government issued 
an explanation saying in part: 
" .................. In order to make the national defence perfect it is 
necessary to promote the iron and steel industry which forms its basis 
" ......... 
This was the basic idea characterizing not only the establishment of 
the Yawata Iron Works but also the subsequent development of the iron 
and steel industry as a whole. 
The industry expanded on the strength of protective interference by 
the State, always maintaining a strong military tincture though the State 
control assumed different character and significance according to changes 
in the circumstances at different times. 
Among the measures taken in connection with the State control were 
the legislation of the Iron Industry Encouragement Law in 1917, its 
revisions on several occasions, tarriff increase for the protection of the 
.domestic iron and steel industry, establishment of the Japan Iron Manu-
facturing Co. in 1934, strengthening of the pig iron-to-steel through 
operation system around that time, legislation of the Iron Industry Law 
in 1937 and the subsequent strengthening of wartime control. 
There is no denying that the State control with a military background 
served as a very comfortable arm-chair for the iron and steel industry 
which. was inevitably handicapped by the narrowness of market and the 
shortage of raw material resources. 
It is, however, an entirely different question whether the development 
of the iron and steel manufacturing into a major industry in the manner 
it did was sound or not. 
It is worthy of note that: 
1. The industry could not take a normal course of development and 
there was an unbalance between the output of pig iron and steel, reflecting 
uneven demands for the two kinds of products. (1) As a result, makers 
engaged in through operation from pig iron to steel secured a powerful 
foothold. These and a few other manufacturers, commonly known as the 
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.. Big 5" C" Big. 6" at present), established an unshaken monopoly system. 
2. The industry was inseparably related to the munitions pro-
duction which was of consumptive character, deviating from the process 
of reproduction. 
The State subsidy, which had a great influence on national economy 
during and after the Pacific War as a Government expenditure and which 
was subject to heated arguments pro. and con, was, needless to say, 
issued as a means of State control. The State subsidy generally meant 
a price differential or a price adjustment fund for key materials. 
The pig iron bounty issued in the Taisho Era was the forerunner 
of the subsidy. The grant of full-fledged subsidies began in 1941 and 
became more extensive after the war. 
There is, of course, a difference between subsidies issued during and 
after the war in their significance and chl!lracter. Those issued during 
the war were designed to increase the productive capacity and readjust 
the low-price policy. Those issued after the war were designed to help 
the restoration of productive capacity, thereby contributing to the 
industrial rehabilitation and economic stabilization of the country in the 
midst of severe inflation. 
In their forms, however, they were identical in that they appeared 
simultaneous with the establishment of a price structure and served as 
a supplementary means of price control, offsetting the inconsistency of 
encouraging production and keeping the price of the manufactured goods 
at a low level. In this sense, the subsidy system had much to do with 
the price policy. 
In this connection attention must also be given to the fact that the 
payment of subsidies assured the profitability of iron and steel enter-
prises, that the subsidies maintained and intensified the monopolistic 
rule born in the iron and steel industry as a result of the wartime 
economy, that they were covered with Government expenditures which 
increased the financial burden of the people through tax increase and 
aggravated inflation, and that the subsidy system was in fact a manifes-
tation of the State power. 
(1) .. Present Conditions and Socialization Problem of the Jap.nese Iron and Steel 
Industry" by Yasutaka Sakai appearing in" Cros~Sections of Japanese Economy" compiled 
by the Economic Research Institute of the Osaka University of Commerce. Transition of 
Japanese Iron and Steel Industry after the War by the Tekko Kenkyuk"ai (Iron and Steel 
Research Institute) appearing in No.5, Vol. 6. of the Kejzai Hyoron (Economic Review). 
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II. WARTIME SUBSIDY POLICY 
1. Wartime Control 
The outbreak of the Manchurian Emergency called for an expansion 
of productive capacity from a military point of view. As a result the 
proportion of military expenditures in the State budget steadily increased. 
The iron and steel industry, which came to meet enormous military 
demands directly or indirectly, got rid of depression but was placed 
under Government control which was gradually intensified with the 
passage of time. 
The industry was called upon to attain various odjectives such as a 
rapid increase in productive capacity, self'sufficiency in raw materials 
for iron and steel and the establishment of the pig iron-to-steel through 
operation system .,. a big problem for the industry. 
During the China Emergency and the Pacific War the industry placed 
preponderant emphasis on the production and supply of munitions, being 
subjected to extensive State control covering production, supply, demand 
and consumption. 
State control was intensified along with the development of the war 
situation and the industry received Government protection by means of 
wartime subsidy, of which mention will be made later, and the placing 
of enormous munitions orders in disregard of the actual production 
plan. Thus the iron and steel industry was enabled to show a remarkable 








Table 1: Military and civilian demands for steel in 
the Commodity Mobilization Plan 
Production Military Civilian Proportion I 
I 
of military goal demand demand _~e~:~d ____ 1 
----(ton8)- ---- (ton.j------ (ton8) 
6,247 3,437 1,266 55.0 
5,473 3,006 862 54.9 
4,755 3,568 530 75.0 
5,054 3,964 550 78.5 
5,137 4,075 ,347 79.3 
4.990 4,191 180 84.0 
Source; ·'Crisis of Iron and Steel Industry ond Industrial Structure in Japan?> by 
Ryozo Yamada in Nos. 2 and 3, Vol. 5 of the. Kokumin Keizai (National Economy). 
2. Wartime Iron And Steel Subsidy 
In August 1941 the Price Policy Deliberative Council established the 
following policy: 
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.. It is necessary to give special consideration to the pig iron price 
in view of the financial conditions of the pig iron manufacturing enter-
prises. As, however, an increase of iron and steel prices will considerably 
affect the commodity prices in general, the Government will take various 
measures to make the pig iron production pay while maintaining the 
iron and steel prices around the present level ............ .. 
In line with this policy the wartime subsidy system for the iron 
and steel industry was established. 
Prior to this the Government effected a compensation for increases 
in the prices of imported raw materials according to the Ordinance for 
Distribution Control on Imported Materials for Iron Production promulgat-
ed in July 1940. 
Beginning December 1941 the Government paid a pig iron subsidy 
in order to adjust the discrepancy between the iron and steel prices 
pegged according to the general price system set up in September 1940 
and the theoretical advance in steel price resulting from productive 
capacity expansion and increased demand. 
The subsidy was so designed as to peg the pig iron price at a fixed 
point, assure a seven per cent stock dividend to enterprises and thereby 
expedite a production increase. 
CAs regards electric furnace p!g iroD, however. a different measure was taken so that 
it entailed no Government outlay). 
Table 2: Pig iron and steel prices before and during the war 
<manufacturers' selling prices) 
Item Qualitative 1935 During war 
standard 
Pig iron 
(yen) . (yen) 
For steel 47.75 81.00 production No. 2 
Steel bar Base 19m/m 89.82 189.00 
Steel angle Plate base 12 m/m 88.50 192.00 
Steel plate Ordinary 5.5 m/m 108.00 . 248.00 
Wire rod 0.314m/m 93.27 194.00 
Tin plate 13 sheets 347.00 455.00 
Steel sheet 166.20 254.00 
Heavy rail 132.92 206.00 
Light ;rail 10767 208.00 
Gas pipe 2 inches 261.00 610.00 
Can pipe 453.00 720.00 
Source; The Reconversion Finance Bank's data. 
Inasmuch as, however, the pig iron subsidy alone could not prevent 
the steel price from advancing, the Government began paying price 
• 
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adjustment subsidies for ordinary steel materials and semi-finished steel 
in April 1943 in order to maintain the steel price at the general price 
level of September 1. 1940. 
The system of individual compensation was applied to both pig iron 
and steel subsidies. 
. In the case of pig iron the State treasury covered, the difference 
between the costs of the respective makers and the official price. In 
the case of steel, costs of different kinds of products were calculated for 
respective manufacturers and the Government paid the differences between 
those costs and the official prices. 
Besides these major subsidies, the Government also paid subsidies for 
the manufacture of products specially demanded by the armed forces 
including a bounty for increased production of specific products, bounty 
for production or iron for steel production, special price bounty and 
bounty for the reduction of original unit. 
These Government disbursements not only covered the deficits of 
iron and steel enterprises but also enabled them to net a profit of 11 per 
cent and to declare a dividend of seven per cent despite the fact that 
it was wartime. 
As seen in Table 3 the pig iron subsidy accounted for 86 per cent 
of the subsidies of over ¥ 1.100-million issued during the war. It is 
said that 72 per cent of the pig iron subsidy went to the Japan Iron 
Manufacturing Co.. The pig iron subsidy and the steel subsidy, which 
occupied 11.6 per cent of the total, served to cover the losses of mono-
polistic iron and steel enterprises. When combined, the two kinds of 
subsidies accounted for 97.6 per cent of the grand total. 
Table 3: Wartime subsidies for iron and steel industry 
(Unit, ¥ 1.000) 
Item I I I I I . ISecond half'i F' I 1942 F' I 1943 F' I 1944 First half, I fiscal 1941 ; ISea lsea lsea fiscal 1945 
I Pig Iron subsidy' 16.464 102.077 156.546 I 346,471 I 331.500 
I Steel subsidy : 25.962! 59.762 44.999 
I Special price i bounty 
Bounty for reduc-' 

















16.464 i 102.077 203.126 428,331 376,499 i 1.126,497 ; Total 
Source: "Outlook of Iron and Steel Industry in Crisis" by Hirokatsu Ichikawa. 
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III. . SUBSIDY POLICY AFTER WAR 
1. Devastation of Iron and Steel Industry During War and Control 
Mter War 
The expansion of the iron and steel industry during the war was 
indeed remarkable. However, the development of the Pacific War and 
the aggravation of the war situation caused the devastation of wartime 
economy, forcing the iron and steel industry to enter a process of 
diminishing reproduction after the peak years of 1942 and 1943 as did 
other industries manufacturing producer goods. (The production of consumer 
goods entered a process of diminishing reproduction in 1939 or 1940). 
Due to various adverse conditions including the shipping shortage, 
difficulty in obtaining raw materials from overseas, excessive use of 
productive facilities, increase 
of unskilled workers and Table 4: Pig Iron Production 
destruction of facilities, iron 
and steel production dwin-
dled despite technical im· 
provement and the produc-
tive capacity expansion 
carried out from 1937-38. 
When the war came to 
an end under such circum-
stances the iron and steel 
industry was temporarily 
stifled like other industries. 
It was natural that the iron 
and steel industry, which 
formed the basis of Japanese 
capitalism and which there· 
fore contained its structural 
(Unit, 1,000 tons) 
Year Blast furnace All kinds pig iron of pig iron 
1936 1,972 2,007 
1937 2,252 2,308 
1938 2,467 2,563 
1939 3,068 3,178 
1940 2,869 3,511 
1941 3,561 4.172 
1942 3,711 4.256 
1943 3,876 4,032 
1944 3,034 3,156 
1945 911 976 
Soun:e: "Achilles' Heel of Japanese 
Iron and Steel Industry" by the editorial 
department, Tekko Shimbun '(Iron and Steel 
Newspaper) in No. 10, Vol. 2 of "Tekko.") 
weakne:;s most concretely, manifested unmistakable signs of its crisis. 
The iron and steel industry had grown larger as a mlll1itions industry 
which produces goods for genuine consumption, deviating from the 
reproduction process of national economy. Its development had been 
attained at the expense of the production of consumer goods. Thus, 
when the wartime economy took a turn for the worse and eventually 
reached its catastrophic end, the industry tumbled into a dark valley. 
How serious the crisis was, caused by the stoppage of raw materials 
import, shortage of motive power, superannuation of productive facilities, 
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demand and inactive production, can be partly seen in Table 5. 
Especially remarkable was the decrease in the production of ordinary 
pig iron and ordinary steel. 
(It is interesting to compare this phenomenon with the fact that the Government 
assistance to the iron and steel industry after the war was centered on those 
branches of the industry which produce ordinary pig iron and ordinary steel). 
Table 5: Iron and steel industry's rate of operation 
immediately after war (1946) 
! I Pig iron I Steel ingot Steel materials I' 
I I Blast'l Electricl Open I Electric ordinaryl' Special I Cast Iwrought. 
11 _______ --"II'fu_r_n_ac_e-i-fu_r_n_ac_e-i-h_e_art_h-+-fu_r_n_ac_e-'cl_st_ee_l---+_st_e_el--i-I_st_e_el--i-_st_ee_l_! 
Productive 
I capacity 5,614 226 7,145 2.179 8,957 738 316 206 I 
, (in 1,000 tons) . I 
, Actual output I . I 
! (in 1.000 tons) 140 60 167 404 296 79 73 18, 
I i II' I Rate of operation i 
,(%) 2.5 26.5 2.3 18.5, 3.3 1O.7! 23.1 8.7 
Source: AbotJe-menit"oned article by Ryozo Yamada. 
The extreme sluggishness of production reflected the paralytic 
conditions bordering on the stoppage of production in postwar Japan, 
which were especially conspicuous in enterprises possessing a huge 
capital. 
It cannot be denied or overlooked that the iron and steel industry 
plays an important role in the process of the peaceful reconstruction of 
Japanese capitalism because it is the material basis of productive activities, 
being the supplier of basic materials for the restoration of productive 
capacity. 
State control had to be carried out on a clean slate after the war. 
At the end of the war the various control regulations were virtually 
abolished and the wartime control system was scrapped, marking the 
end of the wartime control. 
(Principal among the steps taken along this line was the abolition of the 
Iron and Steel Selling Co., Ltd. and the Japan Cast Ironware Co., Ltd. on July 
21, 1947 and the Iron and Steel Control Association on August 6 the same year). 
To institute an autonomous control replacing the State control hither-
to in existence, the Japan Iron and Steel Council, a makers' organization, 
was established in December 1945. 
The autonomus control, however, proved not effective enough to 
cope with the devastation and confusion of postwar economy and ever-
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mounting inflation. With the promulgation of Emergancy Financial 
Measures in February 1946 and the subsequent announcement of a new 
price policy as a turning point, the iron and steel industry was again 
placed under State control. 
These measures were of course applied not only to the iron and 
steel industry but other industries as well, but there was no doubt that 
emphasis was placed on the coal mining and iron and steel manufacturing 
as witness the priority production plan adopted in 1947. 
Priority treatment was given the industries manufacturing producer 
goods which supply basic materials for the rehabilitation of postwar 
economy. Powerful State protection was given the coal, iron and steel, 
and chemical fertilizer industries with a view to making the rehabilitation 
gradually spread to those branches of industry producing consumer goods. 
This plan was designed to maintain the industrial mechanism 
characteristic of wartime economy and therefore helped the re·establish· 
ment of monopolistic capital. 
In view of the devastation resulting from the forceful execution of 
wartime economic policy, it was necessary for the State treasury to 
give powerful assistance directly to industries. How great a position 
the iron and steel industry occupied in this State assistance program is 
clearly seen in the subsidy policy of which mention will be made in the 
following' section. 
2. Development of Subsidy Policy After War 
The abolition of subsidies studied at an extraodinary Cabinet meeting 
on November 5, 1946 came to be given urgent attention with the issuance 
of .. CHQ memomndum f01' the confiscation of wartime profits" on 
November 24 the same year. The memorandum was a directive for the 
abolition of the war profit tax plan and the Government loan and subsidy 
system. 
The Government therefore made up its mind to .. take drastic retrench· 
ment measures including the abolition of the price differential subsidy 
'system as a rule." 
According to the five·year public finance plan beginning fiscal 1946, 
the subsidies were to be gradually decreased until they would go out of 
existence entirely as from fiscal 1949. 
As it was, the actual developments were such that the enforcement 
of the five·year plan proved well nigh impossible. 
When the national economy was said to beheading for collapse at 
a terrific speed amid the fast mounting inflation, soaring commodity prices, 
and the confusion of circulation mechanism, resulting from unrestrained 
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Government spending immediately after the war, enterprises chose such 
easy-going practices as seeking inflation-born profits in the circulation 
process and engaging in speculative transactions, taking advantage of 
the emergence, as a comparatively large factor in the generally lethargic 
pOstwar economy, of the demand for consumer goods which had been 
latent during the war, and the inability of the producer goods manu-
facturing industry to get rid of the process of diminishing reproduction 
due to war havoc. 
It was under· such circumstances that the Government took recourse 
to the above-mentioned public finance retrenchment policy. It was, 
however, soon obliged, on the contrary, to issue subsides for the 
production of so-called "stabilization zone" commodities as a means to' 
overcome the inflation and production crisis. 
Needless to say, it was not an orthodox way of money-making for 
enterprises to seek inflationary profits in the circulation process. Nor 
is it a proper reconstruction policy for major iron and steel manufacturing 
companies to try to absorb the purchasing power by producing consumer 
goods such as pots and frying-pans. 
Although enterprises ought to produce a surplus value in the 
production process, the postwar conditions made it difficult to do so_ 
The subsidy system was instituted in order to offset these adverse 
conditions ... including an inflationary price advance, decrease in the 
purchasing power, and extreme lethargy of production ... as well as to 
bring the producer goods manufacturing industry into a normal channel 
of reproduction by assuring the materialization of the value produced on 
one hand and to put the rehabilitation process of national economy 
gradually on a smooth track by maintaining the commodity price structure 
on the other_ 
There was no denying, meanwhile, that the subsidy system led to 
the re-establishment of the system of monopolistic economy judging by 
the parties to which the subsidies were given. 
The subsidy system was revived after the war when the first postwar 
price structure was. established in March 1946 and became a full-fledged' 
fixture when the second price structure was set in July 1947. It kept 
on asuming considerable dimensions in the national economy until the 
Dodge Line was introduced in fiscal 1949. 
Note: The postwar price structur Was established in March 1946 and revised or readjusted 
in July 1947 and in June·July the follOWing year. In the first price structure the official 
prices were set at 10 times those of the basic period (1934-36). The subsides were mini· 
mized, being issued only for coal and food production. In the second price structure a 
stabiIizatuln price zone was set with 65 times the basic period's prices as a maximum. A 
double -price system was adopted with subsidie9 given for the stabIlization zone materials 
A STUDY OF IRON AND STEEL SUBBIDY 11 
(coal for -specific productive use. iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, fertilizer and soda ash), 
In the third price structure the preceding year's policy was continued with the exception that 
the stabilization zone, Was set with 110 times the hasic period's prices as the maximum. 
Table 6: Price adjustment expenditures after war 
(Unit, ¥ I-million) 
----- -----.. -- '----.-: Fiscal 1946 I Fiscal 1947 
-Price -"efilistment· expen'di:---- 10318--·,,-- 23,225 tures ' 
For stabilization ZOne 
commodities 
For import commodities 
Others 
Clerical expenditures for 
commodity and Price 
adjustment 
Subsidy to Shipping Ope· 
ration Association 
Transfer to National Rail-
way Special Account 
Transfer to Communi-
cations Special Account 
Transfer to Foreign Trade 
Fund 
Total (AJ 
Total budgeted expenditures 
(B) _____ _ 






































Besides these subsidies a huge amount of "invisibl subsidies" was 
paid for exports and imports. These subsidies totaled ¥ 83,300-million 
in fiscal 1949 when the "cloak" was taken off for the first time. 
This subsidy policy was backed on one hand by direct assistance 
with Government funds in the form of loans from the Reconversion 
Finance Bank and on the other by the adoption of a priority production 
program and the accompanying commodity controL 
Meanwhile, the cleavage became wider and wider between the price 
stabilization policy and the economic reconstruction plan preponderantly 
favoring major industries .at the expense of enormous State funds. 
Protection of large capita1is~ at the sacrifice of the people in general 
invited severe public criticism and the Government was obliged to effect 
a major change in its policy with the enforcement of the Dodge principle 
in its fiscal 1949. 
The Dodge principle demanded the transition from an inflationary to 
a stabilization policy keynoted by a sound public finance aimed at 
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materializing the country's economic independence and the stabilization 
of domestic economy. 
By virtue of the Dodge policy. of which no detailed explanation 
can be given in the present article. State subsidies. the .. legs" of the 
.. stilted economy." were reduced or abolished. new Reconversion Finance 
Bank loans were banned, export subsidies were abolished and import 
subsidies came to be covered by the Government Account. resulting in 
a general recession of State control including the subsidy policy. and the 
encouragement of enterprises' independence from State assistance. 
How the State subsidies were reduced or abolished along with the 
dissolution or contraction of public corporations and the readjustment 
of goods subject to control are shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
Note: The increased appropriations in fiscal 1949 as compared with fiscal 1948, which 
seem strange at first Sight, are due to a change in the budget compilation policy. Unlike 
in the preceding years, when additional sums were appropriated by means of supplementary 
budgets, the budget for fiscal 1949 did not presuppose such additional appropriations, while 
the import subSidies, which had so far been hidden, were brought to light. In addition, there 
were increased requirements for subsidies due to more productioh subsidy appropriations in 
the fiscal 1949 budget. It was the Government's policy to economize in the subsidy disburse· 
ments through gradual reduction or abolition of subsidized commodities and the amounts of 
remaining subsidies. 
Table 7: Economizing of price adjustment expenditures 
in fiscal 1949 
(Unit, ¥100-million) 
Fiscal Actual spending 
Item 1949 Fiscal Fiscal Balance budget 1948 1949 Total , 
(Al Stabilization I 
I 
zone commodities: 
I Coal 365 . a 176.53 176.53 188.47 
Iron and steel 416 15.12 419.43 434.55 .~ 18.55 
Copper 28 0 14.00 14.00 14.00 
Fertilizer 174 7.80 221.57 229.37 ~ 55.37 
Soda 19 0.24 18.80 19.04 A 0.04 




fiscal year 150 150.00 0 150.00 0 
(C) Imported 
m~tet'ials 833 0 731.51 731.51 101.49 
(D) Salt 37 0 37.00 37.00 0 
Total 2,022 173.16 1,618.84 1,792.00 230.00 
Source: .. Japan's State SubSIdIes and Public Finance" by the Investgiation and Legis· 
lative Research Bureau of the National Diet Library. A shows' increase. 
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Table 8: Increase or decrease of price adjustment budgets 
by commodities 
(Unit, ¥l-million) 
Fiscal 1949 budget Difference 
between' 
Fiscal Increase revised 
Item 1950 Original or fiscal 1949 budget decrease Total budget and budget by budget fiscal 1950 
revision budget 
Iron and steel I 25,900 73,987 A 16,290 I 57,697 31,797 Fertilizer I 17,650 34,008 4,317 38,325 20,675 , 
SOda I 800 3,148 A 771 22,377 1,577 
Copper I 0 2,800 A 1,400 1,400 1,400 
1 
Coal for specific pro' 
I ducts and imported coal 0 13,758 9,341 4,417 4,417 
Salt , , 0 3,700 0 3,700 3,700 
Food and .feedstuff 45,650 40,604 7,194 47,798 
I 
2.148 
Industrial materials I 0 15,191 A 9,025 6,170 6,170 
Stabilization woe ! : 
commodities in pre- ! 
ceding- fiscal .. year 0 15,000 2,316 17,316 17,316 
Total i 
i 
90,000 202,200 A 23,000 179,200 I. 89,200 
Note: 1. Coal for specific products and imported coal do nbt include coal for iron 
and steel, fertilizer and soda. 
2. A shows decrease. 
3. SOurce: "State Budget" for fiscal 1950 compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
The pOsition held by the iron and steel industry in the enforcement 
of the postwar. subsidy pOlicy became gradually larger, taking the place 
of coal mining as time passed. In .the process of reduction and abolition 
of subsidies, too, the iron and ste.el industry remained comparatively 
unaffected. The magnitude of financial assistance by the State to the 
iron and steel industry. has often attracted attention and become a subject 
of discussion. 
The following chapter will deal with details of the. iron and steel 
subsidies and their controversial points. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF POSTWAR IRON AND STEEL SUBSIDIES 
1. Classification 
In the classification of subsidies, only those subsidies which concerned 
such goods as directly contributed to the formation of prices will be 
taken up for study. 
According to this criterion, the iron and steel subsidies can be roughly 
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classified into' iron and steel subsidy included among the stabilization 
zone commodities subsides (Domestic Subsidies), subsidy ·for coal for 
specific industries and the import subsidy. 
Domestic subsidies were issued for pig iron and semi-finished and 
finished steel for sale_ As for steel materials, the subsidy was limited 
to ordinary steel. No subsidy was given for steel for export. 
These were iron and steel subsidies in the original sense of the term. 
The subsidy for coal for specific industries was issued in the form 
of a compensation by the national treasury to the Solid Fuel Distribution· 
Public Corporation for the balance betweE:n the general consumer's price 
of coal and the special price at which coal was sold to those key indus-
tries in whose cost of production the coal expenditure occupies a consider-
able percentage (specific industries). 
This subsidy was set up in view of the great effect of coal as a 
source of motive power upon key industries. It is said also that the 
subsidy was designed to readjust the wide difference between the prices 
of coal and electric power as heat sources. (The coal price was 300 times 
that of the basic period, whereas the electric power charge was only 30 times). 
The import subsidy was listed as such in the national budget for 
the first time in fiscal 1949. Before the exchange rate was SE:t at ¥ 360 
in April 1949 what was actually a subsidy was paid by the Government 
through a clandestine manipulation of the Foreign Trade Fund. 
In those days imported materials and commodities were sold through 
the Special Account for Foreign Trade Fund. The proceeds thus obtained 
were used for subsidizing imported and exported materials and com-
modities_ As a result, the Special Account for Foreign Trade Fund, 
which ought to leave a favorable balance due to the excess of imports 
over exports, showed a deficit on the contrary. 
This unsavory operation was brought to an end with the adoption 
of the Dodge Line. Beginning fiECal 1949 the U. S. Aid Counter Fund 
Special Account and the Special Account for Foreign Trade were es-
tablished, while the Special Account for Foreign Trade Fund was abolished. 
At the same time the export subsidy was abol.ished and the import 
subsidy was taken into the General Account. 
The import subsidies related to iron and steel are those for pig iron, 
iron ore, and coal import. (Up to fiscal 1948 subsidies were paid also for 
the import of manganese, cryolite, and other secondary raw materials). 
2. How Iron and Steel Subsidies Were Issued After the War 
During the war the iron and steel prices were fixed at ¥ 81 per 
ton pig iron and ¥ 189 for steel bar and the balance between the pegged 
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prices and the costs of production were covered by the Government 
with the payment of price adjustment subsidies. 
The prices were revised, however, simultaneous with the abolition 
of subsidies in the second half of fiscal 1945. The new prices were 
based on the assumption that the annual production of pig iron would 
total 600,000 tOns fuid that of steel materials, 500,000 tons. In fixing 
the new prices no consideration was given the maintenance cost for 
unoperated facilities. It was decided to issue subsidies in the latter half 
of fiscal 1945 when conditions were unfavorable to production. 
The official prices had to be revised, however, in March 1946 simul-
taneous with the establishment of the commodity price structure because 
the iron and steel production did not pay, being affected by the progress 
of inflation and the over-estimate of the volume of production. 
On the assumption that the production of pig iron would total 
580,000 tons and that of ordinary steel, 5,000,000 tons, the new official 
prices were set at 27 times that of the basic period for pig iron and 29 
times for steel bar, both of which were considerably higher than the 
official prices of other commodities. 
Table 9: Iron and steel prices up to revision in March 1946 






1941 1945 1946 
Bar 
, 
19m/m I 189 I ¥ 2.600 
) I ¥ I ¥ 1,680 Plate 
, 
12m/m 223 I 1,960 3.030 
Sheet i 1.6rn/rn 269 I 2.430 3.760 
, , 
Ordinary wire rod , 5.5m/m 194 2.000 3,100 
Tin plate O.314m/rn 443 3.570 5.520 
Gas pipe 3!- inches 338 2.890 4.470 
Hoop 2.7 rn/m 259 2.280 3.530 
Heavy rail 50 kg 206 
I 
1,680 2,600 
Light rail 10 kg I ~08 1,850 2.850 
Pig iron for steel No.2 i 81 I 830 1,300 Production I I , i 
Source: Steel Materials Cluh's data. 
Nevertheless, iron and steel manufacturers suffered enormous deficits 
due to inactive production and high cost, bringing the subsidy problem 
to the fore again. 
As a result of negotiations between the Federation of Iron and Steel 
Industries and the Government offices concerned it was decided to cover 
the deficits with a price equalization fund to be created with the added 
value of special properties formerly in the possession of the military 
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authorities resulting from the price revisions in November ·1945 and 
]March 1946. 
An ordinance was issued, moreover, to exempt iron and steel manu-
facturers from paying price differentials on ordinary steel in fiscal 1947 
so as to enable them to cover their deficits. (There was no price revision 
for special steel). The subsidies issued between August 1946 and March 
1947 are said to have totaled ¥ 450·million and petween April and June 
1947 ¥ 323-million. 
Meanwhile, the gap between the cost of production and prices grew 
wider and wider, reflecting an ever-aggravating inflation. As a result 
the Government effected a wholesale revision of official prices in July 
1948. 
On the occasion of this price revision the Government set a doble 
price system, one for the producer and the other for the consumer, for 
iron and steel as well as other "stabilization zone" commodities. The 
balance between the two prices was paid as subsidies from the General 
Account, thus marking the establishinent of a full-fledged iron and steel 
subsidy system. 
From the standpoint of the iron and steel industry itself, the establish-
ment of the subsidy system spelt the transfer of its emphasis from the 
acquisition of inflationary profits to money-making through production. 
The iron and steel prices revised in JUly 1947 were again marked up 
in June 1948 due to the power shortage caused by the drought of the 
Table 10: Iron and steel prices in the second and third price 
structures 
Revised prices of July 1947 Revised prices of June 1948 
Item Base 
Producer I Consumer I S bs' d Producer 'Consumer I price, ClF Price, ClF u 1 y price, CIF] price, ClF Subsidy 





12m/m 12,670 7,250. 5,420 24.070 12,250
1 
1l,820 
Sheet 1.6m/m 15,270 8,690' 6,580 30,160 14.690
1 
15,470 
Ordinary I 5.5m/m 12.340 7,010 5,330 24.810 12,960 wire rod I 
H.850
1 Tin plate 0.314m/m 23,060 13.120, 9,940 63,740 38,200
1 
25,540, 
Gas pipe 3~ inches 17,660 10,060' 7,600 38,090 17,000 21,090 
Hoop 2.7m/m 13,520 
. I 
27,940 7,730, 5,790 13,060 14,880 
Heavy rail 55 kg 12,680 
, 
7,250 5,430 26,840 12,250 14,590
1 
Light rail 10 kg ll,510 6,590' 4,920 24,620 H,130 13,490 
Pig iron for ! 




Source: Steel Matenals .Club·s data. 
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1947-48 winter, struggle for wage increases and general price upswing_ 
In this case there was no change in the pricing system. 
The first step taken after the establishment of the Dodge-initiated 
balanced public finance was the reduction of subsidy for semi-finished 
steel effected in April 1949 and the accompanying price revision by which 
the producer prices were reduced by 12 per cent on the average. 
It was, however, in September 1949 when the coal subsidy was 
abolished that the reduction of iron and steel subsidies began in real 
earnest. 
On the assumption that a 10 per cent reduction could be effected 
through rationalization of enterprises, the producer prices of pig iron 
and steel materials were increased 22 and 18 per cent respectively, while 
the consumer prices were raised 105 and 36 per cent respectively. 
In January 1950 the subsidies for imported coal and iron and steel 
were reduced as a third- stage measure of the Dodge policy and at the 
same time the producer prices of pig iron and steel materials were 
increased by 8 per cent and 11 per cent respectively and the consumer 
prices by 31 per cent each. 
As a fourth-stage measure the steel materials subsidy was abolished 
and the pig iron subsidy was reduced by 50 per cent on the average 
in July 1950. 
Further reduction of the pig iron subsidy was carried out in October 
the same year as a fifth-stage measure. The subsidy was entirely 
abolished in April 1951. 
The most outstanding characteristic of the public finance after the 
war was that expenses for the termination of war and subsidies occupied 
a great proportion comparable to that of military expenditures in the 
past. Although the expenses for the termination of war decreased as 
time passed, the subsidies swelled on the contrary. The iron and steel 
SUbsidy, in particular, increased by leaps and bounds until fiscal 1949. 
As seen in Table 13, the iron and steel subsidy held a dominant 
position among subsidies for various commodities, and remained as such 
even after the enforcement of the policy of abolishing or reducing sub-
sidies. 
As mentioned before, the Government issued a subsidy for coal for 
specific products as a kind of raw material subsidies in addition to the 
price differential subsidies for iron and steel products. This subsidy 
served to mitigate the *high cost of production in key industries. 
(* Note: For instance, the expense for coal occupies 50 per cent of the p~g iron pnce 
in Japan, whereas it accounts for only 10 per cent to 15 per cent in the United State" and 
some 30 per cent in India. Before the war the percentage was not so high, being 30.4 in 
1934. but it was as high as 53.7 per cent in 1950). 
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Table 11: Changes in iron and steel official 
--------------,--_ .. _------
Revised prices of April 1949 
Item Base Produer Consumer Producer 





¥ 18'72~ ¥ 10.1:0' .¥ 8,600 ¥ 23,000 
Plate I 12m/m . 21,080 12.250 8,780 25,700 
Sheet 1 1.6m/m ! 
14.690 11,760 32.790 26,450
1 
Ordinary wire rod , 5.5m/m I 21.790 1I;850 9,940 26.990 I 
Tin plate i 0.314m/m 6[,3201 38.200 23.120 74.190 
Gas pipe 3J~ inches 34.320 17,000 17,320 41,330 
Hoop 2.7m/m 
, 
24.620 13.050 lI,560 29,470 
Heavy rail 55 kg 23.620 12,250 1I,370 28.810 
Light rail 10 kg 21,820 1I,140 10,680 27.120 
Pig Iron for steel No.2 13,300 3.600 9,7001 17,000 production 
Source: Steel Materials Club's data. 
Table 12: Details of price adjustment expenditures (Unit, ¥ I-million) 
i Fiscal 1947 Fiscal 1948 Fiscal 1949 Fiscal 1949 Fiscal 1950 
[
' main budget Supplementary 
budget 
----,--~~--,--+---~~ 
,Amount I % IAmount! % IAmount ! % IAmount! % IAmount % ! 
Stabilization I' I 
zone I 
commodities: (1)(299)' (5,291) (5,291) 












3.873 16.7 20,893 33.4 
808 3.5 2.576 4.1 
1,815 7.8 10,201 16.3 
159 0.7 1,030 1.6 













22,937 14.6 13.702 15.2 
(722) 
1,904 1.5 800 0.9 
(15.000) 
87,349 57.1 33,271! 37.0 
83.300 41.2 73,151 40.8 56,729 63.0 
modities I 
Others 6.9121 29.8 1I,737 18.8 3,700 1.8 3,700 2.1 
Total I 23,225 100.0 62,500 100.0 202,200 100.0 179,200 100.0 90,000 1100.0 II'-r;;~los~~~~ to -I -- ----~~~ 1 - --- -1;~;~,1 --~ --- 28.7 -1---- 24.1 -!I- 13.6 -II 
, expenditures 
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate the sums brought forward from the perceding 
fiscal year except (1). 
2. Source: The above~mentiolled book of the National Diet Library and "State Bud-
get" for fiscal 1950 compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
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prices in the process of reduction of subsidies 
~~~!~~~iW~Of i Revised prices of January 1950' Re~i~~c!- ~ri~~;-~fJ~I;J:950-~1 
. i "I I I 'i 
Consumer I S bs'dy . i Producer Consumer I Subsdy 'I Producer ! Consumer 
price, CIF lUI Iprice, CIF price, CIF 1 price, CIF I price, CIF 
9,240 ¥ 25,540 ¥ 18,000 ¥7,540-I, -----" 
9,450 27,810 21,010 6,800
1 
12,530 33,5<:0 25,940 7,600 
10,610 27,260 21,400 5,8601 
25,430 74.9£0 63.400 11,590 Abolished 'Abolished 





22.910 18,420 45,210 30,100 15,110 
.17,230 12,240 30,780 21,880 8,900 
12.050 28,760 22,000 6,760. 





___ ~~JL' ___ 9_,6_00_1 ___ 1_8_,3_60, ___ __ 8,610 { 15,850 18,100 11,880 
I 
Table 13: Proportional comparison of subsidies for 
stabilization zone commodities 
Coal 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 1 
, 
Fertilizer ! 








1947 1948 1949 
main 
I budget 
59.2% 31.6% 36.3 % 
23.7 41.2 40.8 
5.0 5.1 2.8 
11.1 20.1 17.8 




100.0 100.0 I 
Table 14: Coal prices 












Price for general 
I 
Price for specific 
consumers consumers 
I 1.208.58 I 
600 















The subsidy for coal for specific products was issued to cover the 
difference between the coal prices for general and specific consumers. 
Table 14 and 15 show how wide the difference was between the two prices. 
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Table 15: Reduced prices of coal for the production 
of iron and steel 
(Unit, yen per ton) 




iron and steel subsidy 
Imported coal 4.885 1,985 2.900 
Special use 4.621 1.407 3.214 coal No.1 
Special use 4;513 1,382 3.131 
cool No.2 
Producer coal 5,091 2.023 3,069 
General coal 4,972 1,997 2,973 
Source: "Tekko" (Iron and steel) Vol. I, No.5 
Table 16 shows the subsidy for coal for iron and steel production 
in the general budget for fiscal 1949. 
Table 16: Subsidies for coal for specific industries 
(Iron and steel) 
Quantity Subsidy per ton Total amount 
of subsidy (in 1,000 tons) (in yen) (in ¥ I-million) 




(12,690) (2,680) (30,200) 
Imported coal 1,600 3.258 
I 
5,213 




(Grand total) (14.160) I (36,500) 
, 
The subsidy for coal for iron and steel production was abolished 
as of August 1949. 
This subsidy was given for coal for pig iron and ordinary steel 
production but not for special steel production. 
As mentioned before. the import subsidy for iron and steel was 
included in the general account budget beginning fiscal 1949. The items 
subject to the subsidy were pig iron. coal and iron ore. 
Although there are no data showing the exact amounts of subsidies 
for the import of raw materials for iron and steel issued before fiscal 
1949. the Budget Bureau of the Finance Ministry estimates the amounts 
of subsidies per ton as follows: Table 17. 
How the import subsidies for iron and steel were issued in fiscal 
1949 is shown in Table 18. 
Due to the increase of iron and steel prices simultaneous with the 
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reduction of subsidies in several stages as well as the improvement of 
production technique, it became unnecessary to keep the prices of imported 
raw materials at low levels. It is said Table 17 
that almost no import subsidies for Import subsidies per tan 
raw materials for iron and steel were (July 1948) 
paid during fiscal 1950 although appro· 
priations for such subsidies were in 
the fiscal 1950 budget. 
The three kinds of subsidies con· 
cerning the iron and steel industry 
appropriated in the fiscal 1949 budget 













Table 18: Import subsidies for iron and steel in fiscal 1949 
Iron ore Coal Pig iron Total 
Quantity 
(in 1,000 tons) 1,675 1,600 120 
Board of Trade 
price (in yen) 6,640 7,949 29,050 
Board of Trade 
release price 
(in yen) 2,260 4.835 3,960 
Subsidy per ton 
(in yen) 4.390 3,114 26.090 
Total amOUnt 
of subsidy 
(in ¥ I-million) 7.328 4.982 2,505 14.839 
Source: "Tekko" (Iron & Steel) Vol. 1, No.5 
Table 19: Price adjustment funds concerning iron and steel 
in the fiscal 1949 budget 
I Price 
, 
Proportion to Persentage 
I 
adjustment the total 
funds sum of price 
adjustment 
I funds 
(in ¥ I-million) (%) (%) 
Pig iron and steel 
Subsidies 41,600 20.5 56.5 
Coal subsidy 17,273 8.9 23.4 
Subsidies for imported 
raw materials 14.839 7.3 20.1 
Total 73,712 36.7 100.0 
._.- --------,--------,------
-
Source: "Tekko" (Iron & Steel) Vol. I, No.5 
, 
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As seen in Table 19 the direct and indirect subsidies for iron and 
steel accounted for as much as 36.7 per cent of the total amount of 
price adjustment funds. How the iron and steel subsidies were reduced 
in the readjusted budget for fiscal 1949 and the budget for fiscal 1950 is 
shown in Table 20. 
Table 20: Details of price adjustment funds 
(Unit. ¥ I-million) 
Fiscal . Difference [ Fiscal 1949 budget ! between : 
1950 
ilncrease-or .-----, ~s~~;u~~~i I budget 
Original \ decrease as ~ budget and 
budget a resu!t of Total : fiscal 1950 I 
I read 'ust- budget 
I ment . 
Iron and steel: --I 
Domestic subsidies: 
I Pig iron 13.987 17,500 2.346 15,136 1,149 
Semi·finished steel 0 1,100 
[ 
311 1.411 1,411 
Steel materials 4.624 22.300 I 1.056 23,356 18,732 
Cast iron tube 158 700 I 175 525 367 
Subsidy for coal for i I 
specific products 0 12,194 i 6,258 5,936 5,936 
Import subsidies. I I 
Coking coal 1,955 10,336 
I 
6.000 4.366 2.381 
Pig iron 512 2.505 900 1,515 1,003 
Iron ore 4.644 7.352 I 1,870 5,482 818 
Total 25,900 73.987 I 16,290 57,697 31,797 
Fertilizer 17,650 34.008 I 4.317 38,325 20,675 Soda 800 3,148 771 2,377 1,557 
Copper 0 2,800 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Coal for specific products 
and imported coal 0 13.758 9,341 4.417 4.417 
Others 45,650 59,495 1,831 57,668 12,018 
Subsidies for stabilization 
zone commodities in 
preceding fiscal year 0 15,000 2,316 17,316 17,316 
Grand total 90,000 202,200 23,000 179,200 89,200 
Note: 1. Subsidies for coal for speCific products and imported coal do not include those 
for coal for iron and steel, fertilizer and soda production. 
2. Others include salt, foodstuff, feedstuff and industrial materials. 
3. The table was compiled on the basis of the" State Budget" for fiscal 1950 
by the Finance Ministry. 
Aside from the comparative increase of subsidies for imported food-
stuff and feedstuff. the iron and steel subsidies kept on holding an 
important position. (The figures given in the above table were. however. 
'" . 
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budgeted sums which were different from the actually paid amounts due to 
the abolition or reduction of subsidies). 
The subsidies for the iron and steel industry, which held a predomi-
nant position in the subsidy policy are indicative of where the emphasis 
was laid in the rehabilitation of postwar economy. 
The iron and steel industry became the largest recipient of State 
subsidies in view of its importance as the kernel of industries producing 
means of production and the supplier of key materials to all industries. 
The economic reconstruction centering around heavy industry thus 
was placed on the right track of reproduction with the low-priced iron 
and steel as its prime mover. 
Viewed from another angle, however, it can be said that a high cost 
of production ... an artifically lowerd price in other words ... which 
hampered a thorough functioning of the law of value found its way into 
an opaque receptacle called public finance. 
3. Subsidies Seen From The Standpoint Of Price Formation 
What part did the iron and steel subsidies, which held a very 
important position in public finance, play in price formation? An analysis 
will be made in this respect in the following paragraphs. 
The producer price was set on the basis of diata submitted by iron 
and steel manufacturers,* while the consumer price was fixed as an item 
of the stabilization zone commodities in the commodity price system. 
*(Note: The suppliers of data were mostly the Big Five makers and in particular the 
three through .operation manufacturers, while the Nichia Steel Manufacturing Co. and the 
Toyo Kohan were chosen as the suppliers of data for steel hoops and tin plates respectively). 
The balance between the producer and consumer prices was set 
officially as the amount of subsidy. 
The relations among the producer and consumer prices and the 
subsidy can be shown by the following equations: 
Unit subsidy = Producer price, ClF-Consumer price, ClF 
= Producer price, FOB-Consumer price, FOB 
ClF price-FOB price, = Freight pool charge + Public corporation 
commission 
In fixing the unit subsidy and consequently the producer price the 
annual production estimate, operation degree, proportion of raw materials 
mixing and other factors were presented. 
Needless to say, these factors are subject to change according to 
the conditions of national economy and the iron and steel industry itself. 
Following is a general review of the changes in the factors contri· 
buting to the fixing of the unit subsidy: 
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March 1946: 
1. Production estimate: Pig iron 580,000 tons a year, steel materi· 
als 500,000 tons a year. 
2. Labor wage: ¥ 11.27" a day, Y 390 a month. 
3. Authorized profit: 13 per cent of the cost of production. 
July 1947: 
1. Production estimate: (July 1947 to March 1948) pig iron 350,000 
tons (470,000 tons a year), steel materials 500,000 tons (670,000 tons a year). 
2. Coal price: ¥ 600 after subtraction of the subsidy. 
3. Labor wage: ¥ 2,350 on the average. 
4. Profit: Not taken into account. 
June 1948: 
1. Annual production estimate: Pig iron 670,000 tons, steel materi· 
als 840,000 tons. 
2. Labor wage: ¥ 5,012 (¥ 5,388 including overtime allowances). 
3. Coal price: y 1,000 for use for specific products. 
April 1949: 
1. Production estimate: Pig iron, 1,900,000 tons, steel materials 
1,920,000 tons (for price calculation 93.6 per cent of the former and 67.7 per 
cent of the latter were taken as bases). 
2. Labor wage: ¥ 8,944. 
Needless to say, it is not these factors alone that were taken into 
account in fixing the price. In all probability political designs at the 
respective times also influenced the price fixing one way or the other. 
Putting aside the various circumstances underlying the decision of 
Table 21: Proportion of unit subsidy against producer's CIF price 
Steel bar 19 m/m 43 1 52 
Steel plate 12 m/m 43] 49 
Steel sheet 1.6 m/m 43 51 
Ordinary 5:5 mlm 43 52 
iron rod 
Tin plate 0.314 m·m 43 40 
Gas pi pe 3~ inches 43 55 
Steel hoop 2.7m/m 43 53 
Heavy rail 50 kg 










Pig iron for 55 I 
steel production No. 3 1 76 I 52.7 
__ ~1;t ~~~ for _____ ._:~=-. __ .~~_.I 66 I 60.0 
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prices, a comparison is made in Table 21 between the producer's elF 
price and the unit subsidy in the form of the latter's percentage against 
the former; (cf, preceding price table) 
The above table shows to some extent the great weight the iron 
and steel subsidy carried, but it does not present the whole picture, for 
it concerns only the subsidies for pig iron and steel materials. 
As mentioned before, iron and steel products were subsidized doubly 
or trebly, but the subsidies relative to raw materials are not shown in 
the above table, though actually they did play a great supplementary 
role as hidden subsidies. 
In the revised price structure of April 1949 the subsidies for raw 
materials accounted for 51.5 per cent of the actual producer price of pig 
iron consisting of subsidies, according to an analysis by the Ministry 
Table 22: Analysis of producer prices of pig iron and 
steel materials 
, 
Pig i I iron I Round bar 
I Amount I % I Amount I % 
Subsidies concerning : I 
raw materials: i 
Import subsidies; I 
Iron ore ¥ 3,403 13.3 ¥ 2,647 7.35 
Coal 3,755 13.8 2,635 7.25 
Total I 7,158 27.1 5,282 14.6 
Price rebate for coal for ! I 
speCific products 6,622 24.4 I 5,285 14.6 
Pig iron su bsi dy ! i 6,809 18.9 
Total amount of subsidies 13,780 51.5 i 17,349 48,0 i I 
Producer price, ClF ! 13.300 48.5 
\ 
18,720 52.0 
Grand total i 27,080 100.0 36,069 100.0 
I I 
Source: II Review of Iron and Steel Industry in Japan" ed. by Bureau of Iron and 
Steel, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
of International Trade and Industry. This proportion was larger than 
that of the producer's elF price, which was 48.5 per cent. 
For this pig iron more subsidies were paid whether it was used by 
its producers themselves or sold to other parties at the rate of ¥ 9,700 
per ton. Thus the steel bar price contained a subsidy of ¥ 6,809 per 
ton. As a result, whereas the producer's elF prices for pig iron and 
steel bar were ,¥ 13,300 and ¥ 18,720 respectively, sums about equal to 
them were paid by the Goveenment as subsidies. Their combined totals. 
¥ 27,080 and ¥ 36,069 respectively. were actual producer prices. 
I 
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The relations between the actual producer prices and the official 
prices are shown in Table 23. 
Table 23: Producer prices and consumer prices; 
Unit Pig iron Round bar 
A. Actual producer price yen 27,080 36,059 
B. Producer price, elF 13,300 18,720 
e. Domestic price 9,700 8,600 differential subsidy .. 
D. Consumer price, elF .. 3,600 10.120 
D/B % 27 54 
D/A .. 13.3 28 
As' seen in the above table the consumer prices of pig iron and steel 
bar were set as low as 27 and 54 per cent respectively of the producer's 
ClF prices and 13.3 and 28 per cent respectively of the actual producer 
prices. 
To cite another example, it is said that the combined total of raw 
materials subsidy and price differential subsidy for pig iron in fiscal 1948 
was a little less than 1.7 times the producer price. 
With the consumer prices of iron and steel set at such a low level, 
the rehabilitation of the related industries was carrid out on the basis 
of these low iron and steel prices. 
The huge subsidy was also a basis on which the iron and steel 
industry was reconstructed after the war. 
Whereas the actual producer price was a natural market price auto-
matically decided in the midst of postwar inflation and devastation of 
industries, the consumer price set with the support of Government 
subsidies amounting to 50 to 80 per cent of the actual producer price 
were extremely perverted artificial prices. 
4. Structure of Payment. 
The payment of subsidy to manufactured iron and steel, as mentioned 
before, was carried out by the Price Adjustment Public Corporation. 
There were three categories of business done by the Price Adjustment 
Public Corporation ... price leveling, freight leveling, and adjustment of 
price differentials. 
Note: Price leveling is a means to maintain uniform consumer prices by pooling different 
prices in such cases wherein the producer prices vary markedly due to natural factors, production 
methods or other unavoidable inducements or wherein the prices of imported goods differ 
conspicuously from the prices of domestic goods. Freight leveling purports to adjust consumer 
prices by so arranging that the producers will be paid the actual freight incurred while the 
consumers will be made to pay a pooled freight ... a freight in which different factors, such as 
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the distance of transportation, are leveled to an average ... in the case of commodities wherein 
freight occupies a comparatively large proportion in their prices. Adjustment of price 
differentials seeks to maintain reasonable consumer prices by means of a subsidy payment 
which facilitates adjustment of price differentials. (Finance Ministry: 41 National Budget .,. 
Fiscal 1950-51. ") 
In the case of iron and steel, both adjustment of price differentials 
and freight leveling were employed for pig iron, ordinary steel material 
and semi-finished products, and cast iron pipes. Actually, it could be 
said, the differential between producer prices and consumer prices deter-
mined by the Price Agency on the basis of cost accounting in each 
enterprise was indemnified while freight leveling was also carried out. 
However, this was done in a complicated manner and, at the same time, 
the method varied as time went by. 
At first, an overall purchase-and-sellback system, in which the public 
corporation bought up all products immediately after they were produced, 
was adopted. In other words, iron and steel goods were first purchased 
by the corporation at FOB prices and then at the time of delivery were 
sold back to the makers at CIF prices with the balance kept by the 
corporation as a commission and freight pool which were used for the 
leveling of commission and freight and, at the same time, for indemnifi-
cation of the differential from consumer prices. 
The Public Corporation Act provided that the funds for this kind of 
purchases were to be made available in the form of loans from the 
Table 24: Purchases and Resales in 1948 By Categories 
-~- -~~---~ --~---~~ ~ -~-~-~-~---------
Purchase Resale 
Amount I Value Amount 
(1,000 tons) (¥ 1,000) I (1,000 tons) 
Iron and steel 
Pig iron 
~----3,~!~:::~- ·~I-- 2~,~~f:~:: ----2.:~~:~!~ 
10,575,697 I 16,570.463 1,450,899 Steel material 
Galvanized hen 
plate 
Cast iron pipe 
Iron ore 
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Reconversion Finance Ban1e The working funds for the purchasing 
operation supplied by the Reconversion Finance Bank amounted to 
¥ 3,446-milion as of March 1948. But, with the initiation of the Kodan-
attested bill system in June 1948, the dependence on the Reconversion 
Finance Bank began to decrease gradually and the saving of funds became 
possible. 
Note: The Kodan·attested bill system is explained as follows in the Finance Ministry's 
"National Budget (Fisical 1949-50)": 
I( The Kodan, after taking delivery of products and materials from the makers, issues 
certificates of delivery, ODe orIginal and one duplicate. to the makers who, OD their part, 
draw promissory notes (usance: 60 days or less) to the amount they are to be paid for the 
delivery. They submit the promissory Dotea to' the Kodan for attestation, attaching to them 
an application for attestation, the bank's loan certificate and the Kodan's delivery certificate. 
The Kodan. after scrutiny, stamps attestation on the promissory D?tes thus submitted. In 
short, the attestation in this case is to certify that the transaction has duly been made and 
to assure the makers that the bills will be paid on time. The Kodan, simultaneous with the 
attestation, pays to the makers the interest due for the period from the time of drawing to 
the maturity of the bills. Then the makers, attaching the Kodan's delivery certificate and 
demand of payment to the attested bills, submit them to their bank to receive a loan. 
The bank which makes a loan fills as requested the demand of payment formula and returns 
it to the Kodan which then asks a bank designate:! by the loan bank pay in to the latter 
bank. Thus the Kodan remits through the bank asked to pay in and completes payment 
for the delivery. When the bills are paid before maturity, the loan bank returns to the 
drawer the interest for the period from next of the day the payment was made until the 
maturity of the bills and the drawer on his part must pay back such returned interest to 
the Kodao ...... " 
This overall purchase-and-sellback method by means of purchase after 
production is worthy of attention in that it fulfilled a sort of financial 
function as is mentioned later. That is to say, the commodities which 
were purchased by the Kodan immediately after they were produced 
remained actually in the hands of the makers and they could utilize the 
gap of time between delivery and sellback so the money paid for the 
the delivery might play the role of working funds for them. There was 
nO material difference whether they were paid for the delivery directly 
by the Kodan or whether they had their Kodan-attested bills discounted 
by city banks. It was undeniably true that this financial function played 
a considerably important role at a time when the supply of funds was 
shOrt_ But it requires no elaboration that this sort of thing was a 
deffection from what the price operation ought to have been and, due to 
many criticisms. had to be replaced gradually by other methods. Namely, 
the system of purchasing immediately after production was replaced by 
the system of purchasing at the time of delivery, thereby reducing the 
gap of time between purchase and sellback, till at last the system of 
settling the differential only, instead of the complicated overall purchase-
and-sellback system, was adopted in July 1949. This new system carried 
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out freight leveling and adjustment of price differential at the same time. 
Actually, this was a method in which only the difference between the 
price differential subsidy plus payment for delivery, on the one hand, 
and the price for selling back the delivered goods, on the other, was 
handled and the function of the Kodan as a financing organ was brought 
to an end. Furthermore, freight leveling itself was abolished as of 
December 1949. Thus the business of subsidy payment for iron and 
steel products was extremely simplified. From this time on, the Kodan 
could only pay the amount of subsidy minus its commission after the 
products were delivered. 
In other words, the system of purchasing immediately after production 
could hardly be said a necessary method for adjustment of the price 
differential. As a matter of fact, the adjustment of price differential 
could be done by way of purchasing at the time of delivery. It could 
therefore be said that the method of purchasing immediately after 
production was designed to afford financial relief beyond the limit of price 
operation by specifically complicating the freight leveling business. And 
in this very point of subsidy payment in a complicated manner lay at 
least one aspect of the raison d'etre of the Kodan. 
Note; The flow of funds in the purchase·and·sellback method mentioned above can be 
roughly illustrated as follows; 
The function of the Kodan·attested bill system is also shown in the above illustration. 
Subsidy payment after the deactivation of the Reconversion Finance Bank was made directly 
by the state. In the case of settling the differential only, the differential between payment 
for delivery and payment for the return of delivery was settled without affecting the subsidy 
itself. 
(1) Investigation Department, Reconversion Finance Bank: U Transition of I ron and 
Steel Prices and the Reconversion Finance Bank Loans to Iron and Steel Industry" 
(2) Ditto. 
(3) Juhei Sugaya; "Basic Character oj the lapanese Iron and Steel Industry" 
V. SIGNIFICANCE AND MOOT POINTS OF SUBSIDY PAYMENT 
TO IRON AND STEELL INDUSTRY AFTER THE WAR. 
What then, did the subsidy payment to the iron and steel industry 
signify to national economy during the process of rehabilitation and to the 
industry itself On the way to recovery? How did it influence national 
economy and the industry? In this question are involved many difficult 
issues and some of them are pointed out in the following: 
1. Contradiction and Limit of Subsidization Policy 
Subsidy payment which was initiated as collateral to the price policy 
was originally purported, as mentioned in the foregoing, to rehabilitate 
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the reproductivity of national economy in the field, first of all, of basic 
production goods. But, while still in the making, it had to meet in· 
cessant, severe criticism which even gave rise to what was known as 
the subsidy controversy. Indeed, it had a great significance. 
In the first place, it was controvertible in its relation to the establish· 
ment of a price structure. More precisely, the low wage policy starting 
with the low iron and steel price as in a formula of iron and steel 
price --> coal price --> wage was used; namely, the pressure on the people's 
capacity of consumption in daily livelihood was exercised, it was con-
tended, in the form of a vicious circle between price and wage. And 
there ensued active pros and cons over this contention. 
This wage policy, at the same time, sharply contrasted with the 
subsidization policy. That is to say, these two kept the two extremes 
in the structure of economy ... production of basic producer gOods and 
consumption capacity of the masses ... in juxtaposition during the process 
of rehabilitating the reproductivity of national economy and, through 
national finance, maintained and expanded such enterprises, on the one 
hand, while causing a huge tax burden, On the other. The expansion 
of financial outlays necessitated deficit finance and invited inflation, thus 
forcing the subsidization policy only to destroy the price structure which 
it originally had to maintain. Aggravation of inflation naturally necessi-
tated a sharp rise of commodity prices, next the deflection from and 
then the raise of official prices and, as far as this was concerned, the 
subsidization policy was destined to fall into self-contradiction. This 
situation was inclined to further worsen due, above all else, to the fact 
that the subsidy payment would increase as the recovery of production 
progressed and th~ volume of production improved. 
This process which was, as it were, a vicious circle between price 
spiral and inflated finance, at least resulted in the revision of prices in 
actual figures and year-after-year increases in the amount of subsidy. 
The influence of this subsidization policy cannot of course be under-
estimated, though it must be admitted that there was naturally a limit 
to the subsidization policy as long as it worked through the mechanism 
of prices. That the iron and steel industry, despite the intrinsic danger 
of going into overproduction because of vast equipment, was able to 
manage with the Government's financial aid in the form of subsidy 
payment is said to be, at the same time, indicative of the fact that for 
the sake of obtaining subsidy the enterprise rushed production increase 
even in disregard of a paying business and rationalization. This can 
also be taken to mean that the way was being paved, without due 
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consideration, so that the vast equipment of the iron and steel industry, 
which had unreasonably expanded during the wartime, could gradually 
be put into operation. 
It is not to be wondered that the subsidization policy ... so long as 
it was to assure an ultimate result not related to a productive process 
like the realization of value and in case it appeared during the transition 
from reproduction on a regressive scale to reproduction on a progressive 
scale-was powerless to slove such a question as the structural reorgani-
zation of the iron and steel industry into what it ought to have been 
in accordance with the changes in the conditions after the war's end 
or suce questions as were connected with business management and 
'production technique. That the increase in the production of iron and 
steel did not at all mean that the crisis was overcome attests to the 
limit inherent in the subsidization policy. And, at the same time, the 
fact that the reorientation of the iron and steel industry is now becoming 
a question after the controls on iron and steel have been lifted can be 
said to be an exemplification of that limit of the snbsidization policy. 
2. Subsidy and Enterprise 
Despite contradictions and limitations, the subsidization policy as 
.. one leg of the stilted economy" exercised an influence which can never 
be ignored. It is true that the iron and steel industry which was suffering 
an extreme slump immediately after the end of war was able to recover 
conspicuously by dint of subsidy payment. It can therefore be considered 
that, despite many troubles which arose out of a gradual retreat of state 
controls, the postwar reorientation of capital in the iron and steel industry 
Table 25: Production of Iron 
and Steel in Japan 
(In MIT) 
I 
Pig Iron I 
Common Steel 
Material 
1946 16,919 36,995 
1947 28,951 55,417 
1948 67.335 104,070 
1949 129,057 176,450 
Source: Investigation Section, General 
Business Department, Yawata 
Iron Mfg. Co.: 
41] ron & Steel Statistics, Vol. I, 
No.3" 
could be achieved to some extent. 
However, it was doubtful 
whether the recovery of the iron 
and steel industry was keeping 
in line with the democratization 
of economy which was the 
guiding principle in the recon-
struction of postwar Japanese 
economy and, furthermore, the 
structure of the industry indi-
cated that it was undergoing an 
unbalanced recovery. 
It is a well-known fact that 
the iron and steel industry, which 
increased its productive power 
--
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Source: Ryozo Yamada: Ditto 
during the war, made a particularly big progress in the field of special 
steel due to the need of arms production. It was quite natural that 
such an unbalanced development prompted by war production had to 
suffer a change after the war's end. This change was noted in the 
decline of special steel production and also in the shift of emphasis from 
plate production to sheet and tin-plate production. That the indemnifi-
cation by the state during the reconversion from war production to peace 
production was limited to pig iron and common steel material was 
questionable, even allowing for the fact that other items were in a state 
of overproduction. 
It requires nO specific elaboration that the decline of productive power 
immediately after the end of war affected more than anything else the 
mono;>olistic capital which had been operating with vast productive 
facilities but, at the same time, such huge monopolistic capital was able 
to make a relatively marked recovery as was proven by the remarkable 
increase in the production of blast furnace pig iron, plain furnace steel 
ingot and common steel material. This indicates that the recovery 
of the iron and steel industry after the war was synonymous With 
the conspicuous recovery in the production of commOn steel material by 
dint of subsidy payment. This, in turn, means that the state indemnifi-
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enterprises with vast production facilities. All ins and outs which led 
up to such a situation can be clarified by seeing how the so-called Big 
Five makers were being subsidized. Subsidization after the war. in 
which case the unit amount of subsidy paid accooding to items but not 
by individual cases as in the wartime was kept uniform. was naturally 
large for such enterprises where the turnover was large. The Yawata 
Iron Manufacturing Co .• Fuii Iron Manufacturing Co. and Japan Steel 
Pipe Manufacturing Co .• all of which operate with the pig-iron-to-steel 
through process. were being paid a vast amount of subsidy for both of 
pig iron and steel material they produced. A similar trend could also 
be expected from the fact that the computation of subsidy. as already 
mentioned. was made on the basis of big enterprises. 
Table 27: Iron and Steel Price Differential Subsidy Payment 
According to Companies 
(SePtember 1947 - September 1948) 
Pig Iron i _ Rolled Steel I Total i 
I Amount I P I Amount I P I Amount I I I (¥ 1,000) ercentage (¥ 1,000) ercentage (¥ 1,000) Percentage I 
Japan Iron 
, I 
I I I Manufacturing I 2,458,829 69.4 1,864.444 27.1 4.323,273 41.5 Steel pipe I Manufacturing I 441,913 12.5 1,046,297 15.2 1,488,210 14.3 
Fuso Metal i - - 837,514 I 12.0 837,514 8.0 , 
Kobe Steel 
I i ! Works , 565,543 8.2 565,543 5.4 I - - I 
I Kawasaki I I 
Heavy Ind ustry: 
-





2,045,949 I 29.8 2,684.523 25.8 I 
Total i
l 3,539,316 100.0 6,864,634 I 100.0 10.403,958 100.0 
! 
Source: The Iron and Steel Research Institute: " The I ron Manufacturing I ndustr y 
in Japan." 
As far as the result was concerned. the subsidization policy certainly 
aided the recovery of enterprises. but what was the effect of subsidy 
upon the enterprises prior to such a final result? Was it to adiust the 
prices from first to last or was it to assure the enterprises of a paying 
basis. including profit? The unit amount of subsidy was uniformly 
determined after the war but it has been stressed since 1947 that subsidy 
should be paid on prices not including profit. 
Note: To cite an example in the case of iron and steel prices according to the pr"ce 
structure as of July 1947, the price factors for non-standardized bar as follows: 
I 
I , 
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Expense for materials ............ ¥ 7,242.65 
Expense for operation. ........... 1,733.46 
Personal expense ............... 277.18 
Other expense ................. , 1,164.32 
(Of which, depreciation 
expense) ....................... . 
Income from by-products .... ,' 
Cost of manufacturing .......... .. 
Total cost .......................... . 







It is said that, under such a price structure based so strictly on cost 
prices that even profit was not recognized and with the subsidy payment 
based on such a price structure, the enterprises, so far from earning profit, 
had to run into the red due to inflation or the decline of production. 
Note: For example, the deficit of the iron and steel enterprises resulting from the fixing 
of the price structure in March 1946 amounted to ¥ 320-million at the end of that fiscal year, 
and that reSUlting from the revision of the price structure in July 1947 amounted to ¥ 1,260· 
million at the end of that fiscal year. It was not until fiscal 1948, when the import of coal, 
iron ore and heavy oil became so smooth that the production exceeded the <r.iginaI plan and 
the inflation slackened, that the production became profitable by virtue of the subsidy. 
Was this, however, the state of affairs that really prevailed? 
If the subsidization policy was originally so designed as to aid the 
. recovery of capital goods production on the basis of low prices and, 
therefore, help rehabilitate the iron and steel industry, the prime requisite 
must have been, needless to mention, to realize capital accumulation. 
Assuming, then, that capital accumulation is originally such that it Can 
be realized by a produce-and-sell formula, namely, solely by creating the 
value in what is produced, what significance can be found if the subsi-
dization policy which, by guaranteeing such creation of value, places the 
enterprises on a normal channel of reproduction that does not recognize 
profit? Apparently such seems to be a contradiction. Then, how can 
it be explained if by such a contradictory policy the iron and steel 
industry has been restored to what it is today? Is it not that .. no 
recognition of profit" is after all a mere phraseology that actually means 
the reverse? If so, in what shape does such profit remain as a compo-
nent of cost price? Though it is of course erroneous to depend upon 
a subsidy alone to meet the financial needs in managing an enterprise, 
it cannot be denied that whether an enterprise can be assured of profit 
by being subsidized is one of the Questions whose solution will show 
what the subsidization policy really means to the recovery of enterprises. 
But there is a difficulty accompanying this Question, namely, that there 
is no way to probe into the Question with at least the publicly announced 
data for the computation of cost price. Here are a few points that 
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challenge this riddling, mystery-veiled postwar reconstruction of enter-
prises. 
The Japan Iron Manufacturing Co. appropriated ¥ 284-million initial 
exPenses in its balance sheet up until the first half of 1948, of which 
the borrowing from the Reconversion Finance Bank for equipment funds 
amounted to only ¥ 27-million. Thus it is said that the company had 
a considerable amount of funds on hand. ll Granted that the for-
mation of such funds on hand is considered possible through the marketing 
of what is produced (capital increase must of course be considered and, even 
in the case the prodUcts are marketed, the result will differ depending upon 
whether they are marketed through the legitimate distribution route or on the 
blackmarket), the question that arises is whether or not (in the case of 
the Japan Iron Manufacturing Co.) there could be room for profit. Though 
it is impossible to make a direct answer to this question, not a few 
suggestions in this connection can be obtained from "Fundamental 
Conditions of the Japanese Iron and Steel Indust1·Y" (Author: Saburo Sako). 
Let us take, for example, the basic unit, one of the essential conditions 
for the computation of cost price. A comparison of what actually prevails 
with what is computed by the Price Agency shows that, except in the 
proportion of heavy oil 
in the case of the Japan 
Steel Pipe Coo's Kawasaki 
plant, the former stands 
below the latter. 
What Mr. Sako points 
out is, in a word, the 
laxity in appraising the 
cost price on which a 
subsidy was computed. 
To cite an example, 
when prices were revised 
in April 1949, the produc· 
tion on which to base the 
new price of pig iron and 
steel material was esti-
Table 28: Basic Unit 
- - ----"-,-------- -
Japan Iron Mfg. 
Co., Yawata plant 
(As of January 1949) 
Proportion of coal 
F roportion of 
I 
coking coal 
Proportion of ore 
Japan Steel Pipe 















mated at slightly less than 1,780,000 tons and 1,300,000 tons, respectively, 
or 93.6 per cent and 67.7 per cent of the scheduled production of 
1,900,000 tons and 1,920,000 tons for the year. Furthermore, the gap 
between the calculated prices and the actual prices is considered destined 
(1) The Japan Statistics Institutes: .. The Role of State FUnds in Postwar Capital 
Accumulation. " 
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to increase since the former is fixed while the latter is inclined to go 
down provided efforts are made to rationalize the method of manage-
ment and to increase the production capacity. That, at the time of the 
revision of commodity prices in June 1948 when the subsidization policy 
is said to have been in full swing, the proportion of the basis of subsidy 
was larger than in fiscal 1947 despite the improvement in the rate of 
industrial operation is nothing but an indication of laxity in the appraisal 
of cost prices in fiscal 1948. Hence," it can be inferred that a huge 
amount of secret reserve could have been obtained in fiscal 1948 by 
utilizing the price structure for iron and steel and non-ferrous metals, 
for the proportion of subsidy increased instead of decreasing though the 
cost itself is believed to have been reduced. " 2) It is also said that, in 
the case of plants which produced both the subsidized items ... pig iron 
and ordinary steel ... and non-subsidized special steel (there was 'a considerable 
number of such plants), the expenses common to both categories ... for example, 
the fixed cost in full ... were written into the cost price of the items to 
be subsidized and the cost price data thus prepared were submitted to 
the Price Agency, the resultant lax accounting of cost price having been 
only too natural. 
These are a few examples of the laxity in the cost price accounting 
in connection with the appraisal of subsidy, which may shed light on 
the doubts as to whether there was room for profit or not. When the 
producer prices based on these loosely computed cost prices, namely, the 
highly politically devised artificial prices, are contrasted with the natural 
market prices, a new and different question arises. For instance, the 
gap between the official price and the free market price as of the end 
of fiscal 1948 is such that the relatively small demand for iron and steel 
products at that time is proven. When this situation is compared with 
the situation immediately after the end of the war when consumption 
goods were heavily demanded, it can be understood that the subsidization 
policy served to a very great extent the purpose of assuring the demand, 
so to speak. 
Another question is that, if the natural market price at that time 
could keep the enterprise in a paying position, the subsidy payment 
must have assured the enterprise of an extra income, That is to say, 
the change of quotations for steel material after the subsidy was rescinded 
in July 1950 shows that many of these quotations were below the producer 
prices as of January 1950 when the price control was still in force. 
(2) The Japan Statistics Institutes: /I The Role of State Funds in Postwar Capital 
AccumulaUon. " 
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Table 29: Prices of Stabilization Zone Materials 
(Given in yen per ton) 
--'[Net p~?~:umerl---~~~s~~i---rc;'-i~~~~r .. rB-la-~-~:-rk-e~- -




























Source: Japan Statistics Institute: "The Role of State Funds in Postwar Capital 
Accumulation" 
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In the case of quotations for August. only nine items out of the total 
31 .,. itemized according to bases for 11 categories ... were above the 
producer price. In the case of quotations for October. that is. not long 
after the Korean War broke out. those above the old prices constituted 
only 13 items. These facts can be considered. it seems. to enable us 
to arrive at a judgement that. even if the rise in the rate of operation 
and the rationalization of enterprise were taken into consideration. there 
was still room for the old official prices ... and. therefore, the subsidization 
policy ... to keep a considerable profit hidden in the cost price. 
The foregoing statement is not of course a conclusion reached on 
the basis of an accurate computation of cost price and much must depend 
upon a further and more detailed study. Will not the foregoing state-
ment, however, shed at least some light and provide some data for 
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speculation in regard to the question of funds on hand in the iron and 
and steel industry and the riddle of its rehabilitation which has already 
caused controversies on more than one occasion in the past ? 
3. Question of Funds. 
That the payment of subsidy was made not necessarily to compensate, 
in the strict sense, for the price differentials has already been referred 
to in the argument on Structure of Payment. But if there was some-
thing more than the compensation of price differentials involved in the 
subsidy payment, what was that something? It was, needless to say, 
the function of relief financing. It had, as mentioned before, a relation 
to the overall purchase-and-sellback business carried out by the Price 
Adjustment Public Corporation. Evidently the moot point lay in the 
purchase-and-sellback procedure in spite of the fact that, actually, the 
finished products went to the consumers through wholesalers. It can be 
said that the public corporation which, with its payments for the 
purchases, played the role of relief financing for the makers during the 
period from production, through sales, to the collection of bills, came to 
assume to a very high degree the role of a financing organ and virtually 
undertook the work of temporarily easing the mounting shortage of 
running funds among the makers as a result of the aggravation of the 
postwar inflation (the demand for funds ... to a comparatively large extent 
short-term running funds ... can be considered to have been felt in the iron and 
steel industry which had a large idle capacity due to the conversion from 
expansion of capacity during the war to reproduction on a regressive scale 
after the war), thereby helping the makers keep their business in oper-
ation. There was no material difference in this function, no matter 
whether the public corporation purchased the products directly with its 
funds loaned from the Reconversion Finance Bank or through the attested-
bill system in which the makers got the corporation-attested bills dis-
counted by city banks. A survey of the income situation of a certain 
Tdble 31: Change in Income Situation 
. '~-"--'--"------,-------,-
August March May 
1948 1949 1949 
------------------ ~-------
---' 
, 573 (22.3 %) I 758 (21.4 I 936 (17.3 Proceeds %)1 %) 
Sales to public corporation 659 (25.6 ) 11,000 (38.2 ) 11,219 (22.5 ) 
Subsidy 600 (23.5 ) 1,050 (29.7 W,~~ ~4~:~ ) Other 132 ( 5.1 ) 231 ( 6.5 ) 
Borrowings 600 (23.5 ) 500 (14.1 ) i 790 (14.6 , I -, 
Total : 2.564 (100.0 ) 13,539 (100.0 ) i 5,415 (100.0 ) 
----~.-----_._. __ I- I 
Source: Burean of Iron and Steel, Ministry of International Trade and Industry: Ditto. 
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representative maker by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
attests to the imporatance of the subsidy paid by the public corporation. 
It seems justified to consider that this function of a financing organ 
was in itself the major objective of the subsidy payment in view of the 
fact that such a function was fulfilled nominally to compensate for price 
differentials. For, if the compensation of price differentials was the sole 
objective, there should have been no need of specifically adopting the 
complicated overall purchase·and-sellback system. 
The abovementioned function of relief financing involved in the 
business conducted by the public corporation, however, would prove more 
effective when considered from a wider perspective. This is, in other 
words, to consider the entire question of funds ... not running funds alone 
but including funds for facilities... in the relation between state funds 
and city bank funds. Needless to say, the Reconversion Finance Bank, 
Public Corporation and city banks were closely interrelated in their relation 
to the makers ... the RFB's loan to the public corporation, the relation 
with city banks through the attested-bill system which made its debut 
with the exit of the RFB, loans extended by city banks on the security 
of subsidy to be paid, direct loans extended by the RFB and city banks 
to the iron and steel industry, etc. 
The payment of subsidy in postwar days, when considered in com-
parisonwith the Reconversion Finance Bank loans, was to help indirectly, 
namely, through the price mechanism, the reconstruction of capital and 
the increase of production. But direct loans also had to be made to 
cope with the crisis which could not be prevented by mere adjustment 
of the circulation structure while leaving the postwar degradation of 
productivity as it was. Hence, the debut of the Reconversion Finance 
Bank loans which, therefore, were originally to reinforce and implement 
the subsidy payment. However, the direct loans extended by the Recon-
version Finance Bank, when compared with loans extended by city banks, 
were found to have been such in nature as to bear on behalf of private 
financing organs the risk in connection with capital investment_ The 
Reconversion Finance Bank loans to the iron and steel industry occupied 
73.4 per cent of the total in the case of founds for facilities while the 
corresponding ratio in the case of running funds was as small as 8.4 
per cent. It can be inferred therefrom that the Reconversion Finance 
Bank, by taking the place of city banks which were reluctant to afford 
long-term funds because of the risk due to the aggravating postwar in-
flation and the resultant instability and confusion, enabled city banks to 
turn to the short-term loan operation which was more fluid and had a 
larger margin of profit. 
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Note: There is no room to give full details of the Reconversion Finance Bank loans 
to the iron and steel industry but those to some of the representative makers are epitomized 
in the followin~: 
Fund for facilities loans Balance of loans 
Japan Iron Mfg. Co. 
Japan Steel Pipe Co. 
Fuso Metal Co. 








That short-term fund loans occupy an overwhelming majority of city bank loans is 
shown in the following figures: 
Japan Steel Pipe Co. 
(As of the end of March 1950) 
Fuso Metal Co. 
(As of Oct. 16, 1950) 




An example showing the ratio of funds for faclIities loans and running fund loans is 
given below: 
Fuji Iron Mfg. Co. 
(As of June 30, 1950) 
Funds for facilities 




There were also guaranty loans designed to compensate the loss suffered 
by private financing organs in their loan operation, which continued 
even after the Reconversion Finance Bank's loan operation was suspended 
in March 1949. 
The reinforcing operation by the Reconversion Finance Bank in 
favor of the subsidy structure was made, in a direct sense, in the 
extension of loans to the public corporation as is detailed in Table 32. 
This dependence of the public corporation on the Reconversion Finance 
Bank in securing the necessary funds, however, was gradually transferred 
to dependence on city banks after the initiation of the attested-bill system 
and the decline and eventual termination of the function of the Recon-
version Finance Bank. 
Thus the subsidization policy, which earlier depended greatly upon 
the Reconversion Finance Bank, came to be closely related to city banks 
which, in addition to discounting the corporation-attested biIls, also 
extended direct loans to the iron and steel industry mostly on the security 
of the subsidy to be paid .,. an indication of the relationship between 
the subsidization policy and city banks. 
It cannot be denied that this correlation between state funds and 
private funds resulted from the changes in the economic situation and 
general policy, such as the termination of the Reconversion Finance 
Bank's function and start of industrial investments from the U. S. Aid 
Counterpart Fund, as well as the decrease in the purchasing power of 
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Table 32: Business Funds Returns of Price Adjustment 
Public Corporation 
(In ¥ I-million) 
June 1947 Apr. 1948 Oct. 1948 Apr. 1949 1 
to to to to I 




RFB loans CA): 
Borrowed 12,517 14,887 13,684 5,598 I Paid 9,071 15,424 13,794 5,598 
I 
Balance at end of term 3,446 2,909 2,799 2,799 i 
, 
Attested bills CB): 
I 
Amount attested 0 8,878 28,941 20,040 
Amount cleared 0 3,541 25,310 20,455 , 
Balance at end of term i 0 5,337 , 8,968 8,553 
CA) plus CB): ! i 
Amount of funds raised I 12,517 23,765 1 42,625 I 25,638 
Amount repaid I 9,071 18,965 I 39,104 26,053 ! Balance at end of term 3,446 8,246 i 11,767 11,352 Monthly averge in each 
I 1 
, 
term: I I Amount of funds raised 1,251 3,960 7,104 6,409 I I 
Amount repaid 907 I 3,160 6,517 6,513 ! 












the public, general monetary stringency and the increased importance 
of private financing organs as a result of the national austerity finance 
which began in fiscal 1949-50. Despite these changes, the strong aid 
rendered by close combination of state funds, including subsidy, and 
private funds toward the rehabilitation of postwar national economy 
can never be denied. It will be reasonable to say that such a combina-
tion of state and private funds had begun to develop centering around 
the postwar subsidy system based on the extensive control of materials 
and prices. It will be safe to assume that, centering around the subsidy 
system purported to realize simultaneously the recovery of production 
and the restoration of orderly distribution by keeping the price level 
low ... no matter whether such an objective could really be realized or 
not... and assisted by an auxiliary measure of strong financial help to 
cope with the deterrents preventing normalization of eCOnomy as a result 
of the aggravation of postwar inflation and the deterioration of economic 
order, a structure to facilitate reconstruction of capital in the iron and 
steel industry was formulated and. furthermore. with private funds also 
mobilized. the rehabilitation of national economy under the price control 
was being pushed forward. 
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As is evident in the foregoing statement, one big driving force in 
the postwar economic rehabilitation was the subsidization policy. And 
the fact that the iron and steel industry depended so much upon this 
subsidization policy shows where the primary empasis in the postwar 
economic rehabilitation was laid. It can also be known from this fact 
that the control over iron and steel and, therefore, the subsidy for iron 
and steel remained effective longer than in the case of other commodities 
dUring the period that the subsidy and control systems were being 
discontinued. 
Note: For example. the 41 important mining and industrial products except coal and 
fertiliZer, which were handled by the Price Adjustment Public Corporation, were reduced to 
eight items including pig iron, ordinary steel material and caustic soda as of April 1950. 
While there was no denying the importance of the iron and steel industry 
as a source of key production, it cannot be doubted that the reconstruc· 
tion of capital in the iron and steel industry either by combination with 
such postwar bureaucratic organizations as the public corporation and 
the Reconversion Finance Bank or by means of aid of state funds made 
available by such combination was no other than the reconstruction and 
maintenance of the control structure that was attained during wartime. 
And at the same time, what had necessitated the subsidization policy 
and its historic character can be found in the very fact that such a 
protective control had to go, beyond the legal measures over external 
factors, into a mechanis:n for implementation of capital value. 
VI. Abolition of Subsidy ... Subsidence of State Control. 
A summary retrospection over the period from the debut of the 
subsidization policy until its termination shows that the enterprises, 
which after the war had resorted to what was called the inflation policy 
to obtain inflationary gains by disposing of the materials in stock, came 
to depend upon the subsidization policy after July 1947. This in itself 
was a break from the sheer inflation policy and an approach toward a 
policy to improve production and stabilize economy but at the same 
time marked a period in which the state power interfered with the 
national economy most overtly after the war. As mentioned in the 
foregoing, the postwar subsidization differed from wartime subsidization 
in that itsaved capital out of a crisis which could not be overcome by 
legal measures alone. It has also been explained already that this 
postwar subsidization policy proved effective to a considerable extent; 
its effectiveness proven by the improving rate of operation, increase in 
the anount of production, etc. was particularly conspicuous in fiscal 
1948 when the inflation began to mark time. Then, starting in April 
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1949, the subsidization policy showed a sign of being decreased and 
eventu~lly abolished. In other words, the so-called Dodge Line appeared. 
Needless to say, this change of policy was closely related to the 
metamorphosis which took place in the political, as well as economic, 
situation at home and abroad. So it is very important that the entire 
question is considered from the international angle but, even apart from 
this point, the appearance of the Dodge Line meant the stabilization 
of Japanese economy and, furthermore, its participation in international 
economy. More precisely, it signified the enterprises getting rid of 
direct protection by the state and beginning to find their way into world 
economy with their own power. 
Thus the subsidization policy was the strongest protective measure 
extended by the state toward the enterpises to help their recovery during 
the period of postwar economic confusion up until the time.]apan could 
join in international economy. It was none other than a subsidization 
policy that enabled the enterprises to recover to such an extent. 
The process of postwar reconstruction wherein the iron and steel 
industry was prompted to recover under protection by state capital, chiefly 
the payment of subsidy, terminated with the abolition in March 1951 
of the subsidy payment for the iron and steel industry after a series 
of reductions in the amount of subsidy since fiscal 1949. 
Supposing that the economic activities of private enterprises are 
aimed at the realization of value and therein are given an embodiment 
of their consummation, the function of the subsidy as an agent to bring 
about such an embodiment meant a direct and extremely big protection 
available while chaos prevailed in postwar economy. However, did the 
power of pro:iuction thus recovered really signify that the crisis of the 
iron and steel industry was overcome? Can it not, on the contrary, be 
more properly said that the aid to the enterprises by means of this 
subsidization policy served only to conceal the intrinsic contradiction? 
The contradiction which had arisen out of the change in the 
essential conditions for the iron and steel industry had to be brought 
to the fore as the state control, which was keeping such contradiction 
below the surface, came to play a less and less active role. The con-
tradiction came to be seen in the first place in the rising prices of raw 
materials and production cost. On the other hand, the withdrawal of 
funds in circulation and the monetary stringency consequent to the 
enforcement of the economic stabilization policy resulted in the decline 
of effective demand and brought about an abnormal situation ... a situation 
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which stood in striking contrast to a sharp upturn of production in and 
after the latter half of fiscal 1948 '" wherein the commodities made from 
materials of high prices had to be marketed at low prices, causing 
mounting unsalable stockpiles and increased sales on credit, and indicating 









Table 33: Balance of Stockpiles and Sales Credit 
Stockpile 
of 




Ordinary Steel Material 
(In ¥ 1.000) 
1949-----r----------17-9-.S-15-----+-----4-,4-5-5-.0-32----I 
.. 231.841 4.478.843 
1950 230.961 4.959,145 
.. 255.817 5.509.536 







Source: The Yawata Iron Mfg_ Co.: Ditto 
In the export market also, the Japanese iron and steel industry had to 
suffer from a decline of its competitive power because the handicap of 
its higher·than-the·international·level prices worsened as a result of the 
worldwide excess of supply over demand from the autumn of 1949, the 
conspicuous increase in the export of iron and steel products by Western 
countries, the devaluation of the pound sterling followed by similar steps 
in the sterling area, and so forth. To cite an example, the pig iron 
price was quoted $ 51 in Japan against $ 49 in the United States and 
slightly less than $ 23 in India. As for the ratio of cost of coal and 
and cost of ore against the pig iron price set at 100, it was 31.5 per cent 
each in the United States and 36.5 per cent and 13.2 per cent in India, 
while in Japan it stood at 51 per cent and 19.4 per cent. In order to 
overcome such a situation, the industry had, naturally enough, to be 
rationalized by decreasing the subsidy. Surplus manpower was struck 
off the payroll, the wage system was revamped, intensified use of labor 
was carried out, the basic unit was improved, heat control was streng· 
thened, and sales expenses were cut and saved. But these rationalization 
efforts almost reached the limit in 1950 and the industry, it is said, was 
in no position to expect further rationalization unless it was enabled to 
modernize and highly mechanize the equipment and facilities with a 
vast amount of funds. 
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The iron and steel industry than had to depend more and more upon 
city banking organizations for the supply of funds after the termination 
of the Reconversion Finance Bank's loan operation aDd the change of 
business of the public corporation. namely. the shift from the overall 
purchase-and-sellback system to the new system of paying only the 
differential between the purchasing-and-se1lback prices, etc_ The industry 
also had to turn from the Reconversion Finance Bank's loans to loans from 
the newly-established Counterpart Fund in order to obtain long-term 
funds for facilities. It seems that great significance can be attached to 
this point as the sole measure available. in place of the Reconversion 
Finance Bank loans, for low-interest loans for long-term funds for 
facilities_ 
Tdble 34: Loans from Counterpart Fund to Iron and Steel Industry 
(In ¥ 1,000) 
Total funds Loans extended from Counterpart Fund for facilities 
Fiscal 1949 3.966.311 1,417,305 
Japan Steel Pipe 360,364 
:~~ 
Japan Iron Mfg. 1,056,941 
Fiscal 1950 16,149,139 790,988 
Kobe Steel works 40,732 
Japan Steel Pipe 244.256 
Fuji Iron Mfg. 326,000 






Note: I. Marked", is plan (estimated requirements). 
2. Enji Moriguchi: •. Problems of Capital Accumulation in Iron and Steel 
I ndnstr y" ......... Analysis of Market No. 12. 
Thus the position into which the iron and steel industry was forced 
as a result of the decrease and the eventual abolition of the subsidy was 
none other than a proof of the various contradictions which came to the 
fore as the support by the authority of the state was removed and the 
process of endeavors toward rationalization to survive such contradictions. 
Particularly the abolition of the subsidy in July 1950 caused an anxiety 
that it might throw the industry into a grave crisis but this anticipated 
crisis was averted by the almost synchronous outbreak .of the Korean 
War which invited a worldwide trend toward rearmament and served 
to aSsure a sufficient demand for iron and steel. This not only saved 
the iron and steel industry from the crisis which otherwise must have 
hit it but, furthermore, has helped the rising prices of iron and steel 
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(though this was partly due to the rise in the price of raw meterials), 
resulting in what is called the Korean War boom. But even in this 
boom lies a crisis, for an unbalance in the availability of pig iron for 
steel has come to pose a serious question in connection with the shortage 
of raw materials, particulary scrap. For instance, the confrontation 
between the through·process makers and the open· hearth makers on the 
pros and cons of the decontrol of pig iron can, after all, be attributed 
to the fact that the former has a supply of-domestic pig iron under their 
control and evidently shows that the real question lies in the very 
structure of enterprise characterized by the unbalanced availability of 
pig iron for steel. Despite the efforts for modernization in the iron and 
steel industry after the outbreak of the Korean war, the contradictions 
replete with the danger of bursting into a crisis due to the position of 
raw materials or of the market or the structure of the industry itself 
remain unliquidated unless the efforts for modernization mean the 
reorientation from the very beginning, or at least as long as there is 
room to consider that the present boom is not a normal state of things 
but is a result of abnormal factors. It can rather be said that these 
contradictions are destined to show up in their real identity sooner 
or later. 
Table 35: Prices of Iron and Steel after the abolition of control 





Jan. I Feb . I 
Mar. 
1950 1950 1951 ! 1951 1951 
, 
Bar 19-28mm 24.000 i 26,000 29,000 , 30,000 32,500 
1 
Plate 12-25mm 26,000 I 28,500 30,500 32,500 35,000 
Sheet 1.6x3x6mm 32,000 I 36,000 38,000 44,000 48,000 




33,000 36,000 Wire rod i 
! 
Tin Plate 0.228><20 88,800 102,430 112,110 119,970 129,630 x28mm , 
I 
Gas pipe 3~ inches 173.30 ! 193.50 208.00 233.90 (per f!K)t) 
Hoop 2.7x3.5 29,000 32,700 38,000 41,000 xS1~1S0 I. 
Heavy Rail For 30,000 30,000 32,500 I 34,500 36,500 Rail way , I 
I Light Rail 10. 12. 1Skg 26,000 I 29,000 31,500 I 33,500 35,500 .--~----- ---.-~. , 
Note 1. Prices by Yawata Iron Mfg. Co. except Hoop (by Fuji Iron Mfg. Co.) and Gas 
pipe (by Japan Steel Pipe Mfg. Co.). 
2. Source: Steel Materials Club's Reports 
